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Justification of War and Terrorism 
 
A Comparative Case Study examining  
Ethical Positions based on Prescriptive Attribution Theory1 
 
Erich H. Witte & Susanne Halverscheid 
 
Summary 
The aim of this study is to examine the underlying ethical positions of statements that try 
to justify acts of war and terrorism. Similarities and differences will be analyzed within 
the framework of empirical ethics research. With respect to the current political situation, 
examples of war and terror from both Western and Arabian parties and terrorist 
organizations are chosen. The cases are exemplified by selected speeches and 
explanations from (1) the American Government justifying the military strikes in 
Afghanistan (2001- ) and the war in Iraq (2003- ) (2) the Red Army Faction (RAF) 
justifying terrorist attacks that they perpetrated in Germany between 1972 and 1984 (3) 
the former President of Iraq justifying the war against Iran (1980-1988), and (4) 
members of Al-Qaeda justifying terrorist acts between 2001 and 2004.  
In a first rating procedure, statements containing justifications of politically motivated 
violence will be identified based upon argumentation analysis. The selected statements 
will then be rated in a second process in regard to the underlying ethics. The justification 
patterns will be presented, compared, and discussed in respect to the interaction of 
culture and type of aggression.  
The results illustrate distinctive argumentation patterns for each group examined. The 
inference-statistical comparison reveals significant differences between the types of 
aggression as well as between Western and Arabian countries, whereas the cultural 
factor proves to be more essential. 
 
Keywords: Prescriptive Attribution Theory, War, Terrorism, Justification 
                                                 
1 This study has been kindly supported by the Ethics foundation “Stiftung Wertevolle Zukunft”. We 
thank Lisa Anne Woodruffe, Canada, for reviewing the English version of this paper. 
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Introduction  
For more than 2000 years, philosophers have tried to determine circumstances that may 
justify war and other acts of aggression from a moral point of view. Political frameworks 
such as the “Just War theory” aim at establishing specific principles that are meant to 
evaluate whether military action is permissible (Christopher, 1999; Regan, 1996; Walzer, 
1977). The traditional theory of just war comprises two sets of principles, one 
determining the resort of war (jus ad bellum), and the other regulating the conduct of war 
(jus in bello). It demands that just aims be established before conducting military 
operations, that severe violence should be used as a last resort and that reasonable 
proportionality in regard to violence be maintained (McMahan, 2004). Furthermore, it 
distinguishes between combatants and non-combatants, discriminating somehow 
between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ targets. In this respect, Just War theory has also 
been applied in order to conclude that terrorist acts are not justifiable in a moral sense 
(Coady, 2004; Smilansky, 2004).   
In the field of Psychology, we are interested in how people actually argue when 
justifying acts of violence, shifting the focus from a normative perspective to a rather 
descriptive approach that tries to examine the underlying ethical positions. This 
approach is based on the assumption that moralities are “relative to particular contexts 
or frameworks, which people choose to accept or reject” (Calhoun, 2001, p. 42). As a 
consequence, justifications are expected to vary according to different standards of right 
and wrong. Hence, the question in focus is not whether politically motivated acts of 
aggression are justifiable in an absolute sense, but rather to explore similarities and 
differences within the ethical positions of various groups engaging in politically motivated 
violence.  
The aim of this study is to examine patterns of ethical argumentations that are 
meant to justify acts of war and terrorism. The term “terrorism” is often referred to as 
“intentionally targeting noncombatants with lethal or severe violence for political 
purposes” (Coady, 2001, p.1697), while war has been defined as an “actual, intentional 
and widespread armed conflict between political communities” (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2005). Both war and terror exist in a variety of forms and for various 
historical, sociological, and psychological reasons. In this respect, most definitions tend 
to oversimplify the phenomena. Nonetheless, it can be stated that both war and terror 
consist of politically motivated acts of severe violence. While acts of war are usually a 
condition of an “open and declared, hostile armed conflict between states or nations” 
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(Webster’s Dictionary), acts of terror constitute rather unpredictable acts of aggression 
towards civilians.  
For both types of aggression, justifications have reached the public through press 
conferences, press releases or video broadcasts. Justifications are defined as a positive 
evaluation of an action for which the subject is responsible (Klein, 1987). More 
specifically, it can be stated that justifications are given when the actors anticipate 
negative evaluation of their action or even acknowledge that their actions are somehow 
illegitimate (Keller & Edelstein, 1991). The justification itself consists of giving reasons 
that are meant to outweigh the violations in question (Keller, 1984). Overall, the 
committed action is evaluated positively by the actor. This feature discriminates 
justifications from excuses and apologies where the activity in question is acknowledged 
to be rather negative (Rehbein, 1972).    
Kienpointner (1992) points out that, in daily argumentation, normative reasoning 
does not follow strict logical rules as postulated by philosophers. He distinguishes 
between seven schemes of daily normative argumentation, such as schemes of 
comparing, contrasting, referring to authorities, arguing in causalities, etc. These 
schemes of justifications can also be found in public explanations given by leaders of 
political parties and terrorist organizations. 
The study at hand focuses on the analysis of the underlying ethical principles of 
these justification patterns. It relies on the prescriptive attribution model as proposed by 
Witte & Doll (1995). In contrast to attribution theories that describe how people explain 
the causes of behavior on a factual level (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1973; Jones & Harris, 
1967; Weiner, 1985), prescriptive attribution theory examines the reasons people give 
for their actions on the value level. The prescriptive attribution model draws on the 
widely-known differentiation between means-oriented and ends-oriented ethics, focusing 
either on the duties upon which we base our behavior or rather stressing the 
consequences of our action. Besides these two sets of moral coordinates, ethics differ 
with respect to the extent of the moral community (Harman & Thomson, 1996). Some 
are restricted to the individual perspective, some include all people of a certain group, 
such as people from a specific nation or a religious group, and others include all humans 
of whatever nationality or religion. The original model of prescriptive attribution 
differentiates between two levels of judgement, focusing either on the individual or on 
society in general. In order to apply the model to the field of politics, a third level, the 
group-specific level of judgement has been added (table 1). With the resulting 2*3 
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categories, it is possible to classify the following ethical positions: deontology, 
utilitarianism, particulate deontology, particulate utilitarianism, intuitionism, and 
hedonism. 
Table 1: The extended prescriptive attribution model based on Witte & Doll (1995) 
 Ends/Consequence -
oriented Ethics 
Means/Duty - oriented 
Ethics 
Individual level of 
judgement Hedonism Intuitionism 
Group-specific level of 
judgement Particulate Utilitarianism Particulate Deontology 
General level of 
judgement Utilitarianism Deontology 
 
The fundamental assumption of deontological ethics is that decisions should be derived 
from general principles that are regarded as universally valid. It holds that morality is an 
intrinsic feature of human action, determined by moral obligations without referring to the 
consequences that the action may have (Kant, 1797). Utilitarianism, in contrast, is based 
on the maxim of achieving the utmost good for the majority. It was originally proposed by 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and forms one of the major theories of consequentialism. 
From a utilitarian perspective, moral action demands that a certain good be maximized 
for the majority, while deontologists regard an action as fulfilling moral standards when it 
follows norms and values seen as universally valid. Particulate deontology differs from 
the latter perspective in so far as it originates from group-specific obligations, rights and 
virtues. Particulate utilitarianism, on the contrary, aims at the greatest outcome for a 
specific group of people. Intuitionism considers the reason for an action to stem from 
individual and immediate judgment as to what ought to be done (Sidgwick, 1874). It 
postulates that we have the power of seeing clearly what actions are right and 
reasonable. Typically, these sorts of justifications are not supported by further reasoning. 
Finally, the hedonistic view focuses on increasing well-being and reducing pain for the 
individual. By stating that no action may harm an individual, hedonism goes far beyond 
egoism and constitutes the fundamental basis for an ethical norm.  
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Table 2: Examples of direct justification patterns  
Ethical Position Justification Pattern Example 
Hedonism It has to be acted in favor of 
individual well-being. 
“Should a man be blamed for 
protecting his own?”2  
Intuitionism The action undertaken is 
based on individual insight 
on what ought to be done. 
“In those critical moments, I was 
overwhelmed by ideas that are hard 
to describe, but they awakened a 
powerful impulse to reject injustice 
and gave birth to a firm resolve to 
punish the oppressors.”3  
Particulate 
Utilitarianism 
The action carried out has to 
aim at a positive outcome for 
a certain group. 
“Whatever it takes to defend the 
liberty of America, this administration 
will do.”4 
Particulate 
Deontology 
It has to be acted according 
to group-specific duties, 
virtues and rights.  
“Members of Congress are nearing 
an historic vote. I'm confident they 
will fully consider the facts, and their 
duties. Saddam Hussein's actions 
have put us on notice, and there is no 
refuge from our responsibilities.”5 
Utilitarianism All action must achieve the 
utmost good for the majority. 
“By our resolve, we will give strength 
to others. By our courage, we will 
give hope to others. And by our 
actions, we will secure the peace, 
and lead the world to a better day.”6 
Deontology 
 
It has to be acted according 
to universal norms, values 
and principles. 
“That's why I have said that if we 
don't have security, neither will the 
Americans. It's a very simple 
equation that any American child 
could understand: live and let other 
people live.”7 
 
The prescriptive attribution model has been empirically confirmed in a number of 
different studies (Gollenia, 1999; Hackel, 1995). The ethical categories that have been 
developed a priori were found in empirical data material on personal, interpersonal and  
                                                 
2 , 3Bin Laden, speech released on October 29, 2004, as broadcast by Al-Sahab Institute for 
Media Production, retrieved 9/20/06, from 
http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Area=sd&ID=SP81104 
4, 5, 6 George W. Bush, speech held on March 15, 2002, retrieved 9/20/06, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020315.html 
7 Bin Laden, O. (2001). The Example of Vietnam. November 12 2001. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) 
(2005). Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (p. 141). London: Verso. 
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social actions. Descriptive Factor Analysis attested that the ethical positions are partially 
independent (Witte & Doll, 1995; Witte, 2002).  
Within the process of analyzing public justifications of politically motivated acts, it 
became evident that many statements put emphasis on the violation of ethical principles 
by the opponent. This observation led to the assumption that actions of aggression may 
also be indirectly justified by pointing at the enemy’s amoral offences that have to be 
compensated by taking counteractions. George W. Bush, for instance, stated that 
“understanding the threats of our time, knowing the designs and deceptions of the Iraqi 
regime, we have every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to 
prevent the worst from occurring”8, underlining that his actions are indispensable due to 
the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. Accordingly, the Red Army Faction declared that 
“we will carry out attacks against judges and state attorneys until they stop committing 
violations against the rights of political prisoners.”9 Finally, this argumentation pattern 
may reflect ideas such as taking revenge, as stated by al-Qaeda: “The blood pouring out 
of Palestine must be equally avenged.”10 Due to the frequent occurrence of justifications 
stressing the enemy’s violation of ethical principles, a model of indirect justification 
patterns was developed, consisting of six negative expressions analogous to the six 
ethical positions presented above. Indeed, all six indirect justifications were found in 
public speeches and explanations (table 3).   
 
 
                                                 
8 G. W. Bush, speech held on October 7, 2002, retrieved 9/20/06, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html  
9 Red Army Faction in a statement on a bomb attack against Wolfgang Buddenberg, judge of the 
Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe (Germany) on May 20, 1972. English version retrieved 
9/20/06 from http://www.germanguerilla.com/red-army-faction/documents/72-05-20.html  
10 Bin Laden, O. (2002). To the Americans. October 6, 2002. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) (2005). 
Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (p. 163). London: Verso. 
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Table 3: Examples of indirect justification patterns 
Ethical Position Justification pattern Example 
Indirect 
Hedonism 
The well-being of a certain 
individual is periled by the 
enemy’s action. 
“Buddenberg, the pig, allowed 
Grashof to be moved from the 
hospital to a cell when the transfer 
and the risk of infection in the prison 
were a threat to his life.” 11 
Indirect 
Intuitionism 
The enemy’s action reveals 
a lack of common sense. 
“Those who condemn these 
operations [9/11] have viewed the 
event in isolation and have failed to 
connect it to previous events or to the 
reasons behind it. Their view is 
blinkered and lacks either a legitimate 
or a rational basis.”12  
Indirect-
particulate 
Utilitarianism 
The enemy’s action poses a 
(potential) threat to a certain 
group. 
“We're concerned that Iraq is 
exploring ways of using these UAVS 
for missions targeting the United 
States.”13  
Indirect-
particulate 
Deontology 
The enemy does not fulfill 
his specific duties. 
“We will carry out attacks against 
judges and state attorneys until they 
stop committing violations against the 
rights of political prisoners.”14  
Indirect 
Utilitarianism 
The enemy’s action poses a 
(potential) threat to all 
humanity. 
“This enemy attacked not just our 
people, but all freedom-loving people 
everywhere in the world.”15 
Indirect 
Deontology 
The enemy violates norms 
and values regarded as 
universally valid. 
“And by the will of God Almighty, we 
will soon see the fall of the 
unbelievers’ states, at whose forefront 
is America, the tyrant, which has 
destroyed all human values and 
transgressed all limits.”16  
 
                                                 
11, 14 Red Army Faction in a statement on a bomb attack against Wolfgang Buddenberg, judge of 
the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe (Germany) on May 20, 1972. English version retrieved 
9/20/06 from http://www.germanguerilla.com/red-army-faction/documents/72-05-20.html 
12 Bin Laden, O. (2001). Nineteen Students. December 26 2001. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) (2005). 
Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (p. 149). London: Verso. 
13 George W. Bush, speech held on October 7, 2002, retrieved 9/20/06, from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html 
15 George W. Bush, remarks made after meeting with the National Security Team on September 
12, 2001. Retrieved 9/20/2006 from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html 
16 Bin Laden, O. (2001). To the people of Afghanistan. August 25 2002. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) 
(2005). Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (p. 159). London: Verso.  
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Forsyth and colleagues (Forsyth, 1980; Forsyth & Nye, 1990; Forsyth & Pope, 1984) 
found similar ethical positions. Representing the perspective of personality psychology, 
they define the theoretical background of positions in a slightly different way and use a 
taxonomy based on the scales of relativism and idealism. In so far, their approach of 
examining ethical positions differs from the one presented here. 
It is essential that “different ethical judgments do not imply different ethical 
frameworks and similar ethical judgments do not imply similar ethical frameworks“ (Hunt 
& Vitell, 1986, p. 14). Ethical positions have been found empirically in different contexts. 
The importance of each ethical principle varies with culture (Maeng, 1995), with the 
quality of the actions that have to be justified (individual, interpersonal, and social 
actions) (Witte & Doll, 1995), with social identity (Gollenia, 1999), social roles (Witte & 
Heitkamp, 2005), and with professional socialization (Hackel, 1995). 
 The study at hand will present the ethical justification patterns of war and terror 
that occur within the speeches of the four groups examined. In a second step, four 
hypotheses will be tested inference-statistically. The first two hypotheses claim that (1) 
there is no significant difference between the justifications of war and the justifications of 
terrorism in respect to the underlying ethical positions, and that (2) there is no significant 
difference in the patterns of ethical justifications between the two cultures regarded in 
this study. Based on previous findings on newsletter articles discussing ethical topics 
(Witte & Doll, 1995), it will be hypothesized that in the public justifications of war and 
terror (3) Utilitarian argumentation patterns (U, U-, PU, and PU-) will be the prevalent 
ethical justifications across groups. Finally, the fourth hypothesis holds that (4) the 
particulate ethical positions (PU, PU-, PD, and PD-) will be the predominant justification 
patterns in all four cases examined. The final hypothesis relies on studies on social 
identity (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987) and draws on related mechanisms such as the 
„ingroup favoritism“ (Messick & Mackie, 1989) and concurrent attribution processes 
concerning the “outgroup” (Perdue et al., 1990) that are hypothesized to foster the 
group-specific level of judgment.  
In a third step, further differences between the single groups will be explored 
through pair-wise testing. Finally, it will be examined whether the occurrence of each 
single justification pattern is influenced by the type of violence or by the cultural factor. 
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Method 
 
Sample. In order to contribute to the current political situation, examples of war 
and terror from both Western as well as Arabian parties and terrorist organizations were 
chosen. The four resulting combinations of the features “War and Terror” and “Western 
and Arabian countries” were exemplified by selected speeches and explanations from (1) 
the American Government justifying the military strikes in Afghanistan (2001-) and the 
war in Iraq (2003-) (2) the Red Army Faction (RAF) justifying terrorist attacks that they 
perpetrated in Germany from 1972-1984 (3) the former President of Iraq, justifying the 
War against Iran (1980-1988) (4) members of Al-Qaeda justifying terrorist acts between 
2001-2004.  
 
Material. All speeches and explanations have been extracted from published 
material. The justifications of the war in Iraq (2003-) and the military strikes against 
Afghanistan (2001-) were exemplified by five randomly chosen explanations given by the 
White House. The speeches were translated into German language by “Amerika Dienst”, 
the media information centre of the U.S. Embassy in Germany. The statements given by 
the Red Army Faction between 1972 and 1984 were taken out of a collection of 
documentaries about the German terror organization (Hoffman, 1997). Ten published 
explanations referring to concrete terror attacks were analyzed. In respect to the Iraq-
Iran War, only one speech of the former President of Iraq could by found to address the 
matter in question. The speech was given on an Islamic summit conference in 1981 
(Hussein, 1981). The explanations given by al-Qaeda consist of five speeches taken out 
of a volume of statements by Osama Bin Laden that were translated into English 
language (Lawrence, 2005).  
 
Procedure. Two rating procedures were conducted. The first rating process 
aimed at identifying statements containing a justification, defined as a positive evaluation 
of an action for which the subject is responsible (Klein, 1987). The procedure was based 
on argumentation analysis, selecting statements falling under one of the seven 
categories of normative argumentation as outlined by Kienpointner (1992). Out of 1,728 
sentences, 1,035 were identified by two independent raters as containing justifications of 
war or terror (κ = .571). The selected statements were then rated in a second process in 
regard to the underlying ethics, based on operationalizations proposed by Witte & Doll 
(1995). In total, N = 1,253 ethical positions were revealed and categorized (NUSA = 479, 
NRAF = 125, NIraq = 217, Nal-Qaeda = 432). The number of ethical principles exceeded the  
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number of selected sentences, as 249 statements contained more than one ethical 
principle. The second rating procedure was conducted by three independent raters who 
were trained for this purpose. With respect to the rather complex material, the rating 
consistency can be regarded as satisfactory (κ = .537) (Wirtz & Caspar, 2002, p. 59). A 
non-parametric χ²-test revealed different marginal distributions for the ethical justification 
patterns (χ²(df =11) = 76,065 > χ²crit, df=11, α=.05 = 19,68 at p < .001). Thus, kappa might be 
partially influenced by the different baselines. 
 
Results  
The results show significant differences in the justification patterns between the four 
groups. The ethical basis of justifying the “War on Terrorism” constitutes a rather wide 
range of frequently used arguments (figure 1). While all twelve ethical positions were 
found in public explanations given by the White House, direct hedonistic arguments (H) 
could not be identified within the statements made by the Red Army Faction (figure 2). 
Indirect hedonistic arguments (H-), however, constitute 4.8 % of the justifications given 
by the RAF, indicating that the adversary is seen to be lacking hedonistic values. The 
indirect-particulate utilitarianism (PU-), emphasizing the negative consequences of the 
enemy’s action for a certain group, represents the most frequent form of ethical 
argumentation within the justification pattern of the Red Army Faction (27.2 %).  
Figure 3 shows the ethical argumentations used to justify the Iran-Iraq War by 
the former Iraqi government. Two types of justifications occur strikingly often, namely the 
negative expression of particulate utilitarianism (28.6%) and negative-particulate 
deontology (30.0 %), stressing that the enemy is not fulfilling his duties (PD-) and that 
his actions have a negative impact on a specific group (PU-). These two forms of 
vindication have also been found in 16.9% (PU-) respectively 18.5% (PD-) of the 
explanations given by al-Qaeda (figure 4). Here, the most frequently used arguments, 
however, are represented by deontological ethics, which are mentioned directly in 21.8 
% and indirectly in 16.4 % of the statements.  
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Figure 1: Justification pattern of the U.S. government (N = 479) 
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Figure 2: Justification pattern of the Red Army Faction (N = 125) 
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Figure 3: Justification pattern of the Iraqi government (N = 217) 
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Figure 4: Justification pattern of al-Qaeda (N = 432) 
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Comparing the direct way of justification with the indirect one that stresses the enemy’s 
violation of ethical principles, the data show an excessive use of the latter practice of 
justifying acts of politically motivated aggression. The former Iraqi government and the 
Red Army Faction emphasize on such violations in more than two thirds of their 
statements. Members of al-Qaeda engage in indirect justifications in 59.6 % of their 
explanations, while the U.S. government applies this sort of argumentation in 43 % of 
the sentences (figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Direct and indirect justifications across groups.  
 
Taking a look at the levels of judgement, it is not surprising that the individual-oriented 
ethics are underrepresented in the justification of politically motivated acts (6.9 % ). In 
total, the groups engaged more likely in group-specific argumentations (50.1 % ) than in 
ethical judgements with a universally valid perspective (43.0 %).  
 
Testing of Hypotheses 
Since χ²-testing of the hypotheses requires an expected cell frequency of 5, the 
individual level of judgement cannot be considered in the inference-statistical analysis. 
The relative frequency of the eight remaining types of argumentation will therefore be re-
calculated.  
The first hypothesis claims that there is no significant difference between the 
justifications of war and the justifications of terrorism in respect to the underlying ethical  
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positions. To test upon differences between the two groups, an omnibus χ²- test is 
conducted. It leads to a χ²-value of 70,639 (df = 7, p < .001), showing that there has to 
be a significant difference in the justification patterns between the two sorts of 
aggression. In order to determine which ethical positions account for these differences, 
pair-wise χ²-tests are conducted. Due to multiple testing, the α-level has to be adjusted. 
Von Eye (1990) recommends controlling the alpha level by using the Bonferroni 
adjustment, determining the level of significance by the number of r simultaneous tests 
with α* = α/r. Conducting r = 8 simultaneous tests leads to α* = .006 that is analogous to 
a significance level of α = .05.   
Table 4 shows that the two forms of aggression differ in two aspects. While 
utilitarianism occurs more often within justifications of war (10.1 %), terrorist groups 
seem to engage rarely in utilitarian argumentation (2.0 %) (χ² = 31,058 p < .001). 
Instead, negative deontology is predominant in terror justifications (17.6 %) while it has 
only been found in 7.5 % of the justifications of war (χ² = 28,063 p < .001). In order to 
interpret the size of proportional differences, Cohen (1977) suggests standardizing the
Table 4: Observed frequencies (%) of 
ethical justifycations of war and 
terror including pair-wise χ²-testing 
(df = 1) 
differences through an arcsine 
transformation (Cohen, 1977, p. 181). 
The resulting conversions can be 
interpreted as effect sizes, with h = .20 
indicating a small difference between 
proportions, h = .50 pointing at 
medium differences and h = .80 
highlighting large effects. Referring to 
this measurement, the difference of 
8.1 %  on the utilitarian dimension 
constitutes an effect of h = .36, while 
the effect sizes between deontological 
justifications of war and terror comes 
to h = .31. 
The second hypothesis states that there 
is no significant difference in the patterns of ethical justifications between the Western 
and Arabian countries regarded in this study. Again, an omnibus χ²- test is conducted (χ² 
= 132,381, df = 7, p < .001), indicating significant dissimilarities between the two groups.  
Ethics War Terror χ ² p 
PU 6,1 % 3,5 % 4,059 .044
PD 14,0 % 10,6 % 3,171 .075
U 10,1 % 2,0 % 31,058 * .000
D 17,1 % 21,1 % 3,054 .081
PU- 16,6 % 20,9 % 3,513 .061
PD- 18,0 % 17,6 % 0,032 .859
U- 10,5 % 6,7 % 5,368 .021
D- 7,5 % 17,6 % 28,063 * .000
 NW = 655 NT = 551  df = 1 * p < .006 
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The pair-wise χ²-tests reveal seven discrepancies between the justification patterns of 
the examined Western and Arabian countries (table 5). 
Table 5: Observed frequencies (%) of ethical justifications within Western and Arabian 
countries 
Ethics 
Western 
countries 
Arabian 
countries χ ² p 
 
h 
PU 7,0 % 3,1 % 9,358 * .002 .188
PD 13,8 % 11,3 % 1,710 .191 .062
U 11,3 % 2,1 % 40,403 * .000 .392
D 18,2 % 19,5 % 0,343 .558 .026
PU- 14,6 % 22,1 % 11,023 * .001 .209
PD- 11,3 % 23,8 % 30,710 * .000 .348
U- 14,7 % 3,4 % 46,166 * .000 .447
D- 9,0 % 14,6 % 8,679 * .003 .186
 NW = 556 NA = 610 df = 1 * p < .006 
No significant differences lie within the deontological and particulate deontological 
justification. Besides, the effect sizes indicating the magnitude of difference between the 
Western and Arabian countries within the particulate utilitarianism (h = .188) and the 
negative deontological argumentation (h = .186) can be only interpreted as tendencies. 
They imply that negative deontology occurs more often in Arabian countries (14.6 %) 
than in Western countries (9.0 %), going along with the particulate specification (PD-), 
which is highlighted in 23.8 % of the justifications given by the Arabian group. Particulate 
utilitarianism, instead, stressing the positive consequences of one’s action for the own 
group or an affiliated population, seems to be utilized more often in the West (7.0 %) 
than in Arabian countries (3.1 %), whereas the negative expression of particulate 
utilitarianism, emphasizing on the bad consequences of the enemy’s action for a certain 
group is underlined more frequently by the Arabian group (22.1 % vs. 14.6 %). The 
largest effect sizes occur on the utilitarian dimension. While both the direct and the 
indirect utilitarian argumentations can be found in 11.3 % respectively 14.7 % of the 
justifications given by the Western groups, they represent only a small proportion of the 
justifications given by the Arabian countries (2.1 % respectively 3.4 %).  
The third hypothesis holds that justifications containing utilitarian patterns of 
argumentation are predominant in public justifications of violent acts. In order to test this 
hypothesis, particular and universal utilitarian argumentations are combined and 
contrasted with the frequency of the combined deontological ethics. Table 6 shows the 
proportional distribution of justifications comprehending deontological (61.1 %) and  
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utilitarian (39.9 %) reasoning. Since the rate of utilitarian versus deontological arguments 
adds up to 1:1.6, the hypothesis cannot be held true. Taking a look at the single groups, 
the data show that the Red Army Faction is the only one stressing utilitarian aspects. A 
one-dimensional χ²-test reveals, though, that the difference between utilitarian and 
deontological argumentation is not significant within the German terror organization (χ² = 
0,561, p = .454). 
Table 6: Proportional frequencies of utilitarian and deontological justifications  
 USA RAF Iraq Al-Qaeda total (ethics) 
U combined 46,2 % 53,5 % 37,6 % 27,2 % 38,9 %
D combined 53,8 % 46,5 % 62,4 % 72,8 % 61,1 %
total (group) n = 442 n =114  n = 213 n = 397 N = 1166 
The fourth hypothesis states that group-specific justifications are dominant within all 
public justifications of aggressive acts. Table 7 displays the proportional distribution of 
particulate and universal ethics. It indicates that justifications originating from a group-
specific perspective occur slightly more often (53.9 %) than ethics with a universal 
perspective (46.1 %). A one-dimensional χ²-tests confirms this difference being 
significant (χ² = 6,947, df = 1, p = .008). However, the proportional difference of 
7.8 % constitutes a rather small effect size of h = .16 and can be only interpreted as a 
tendency. 
Table 7: Proportional frequencies of group-specific and general ethics  
 USA RAF Iraq Al-Qaeda Total (ethics) 
Group-specific ethics 45,2 % 52,6 % 74,6 % 52,6 % 53,9 %
General ethics 54,8 % 47,4 % 25,4 % 47,4 % 46,1 %
Total (group) n = 442 n =114  n = 213 n = 397 N = 1166 
 
So far, the examination of the hypotheses revealed that (1) the justifications of war and 
terrorism differ substantially in regard to two ethical positions (2) the justifications within 
the Western and Arabian countries examined in this study vary significantly in respect to 
six ethical argumentation patterns (3) the percentage of deontological justifications is, in 
contrast to utilitarian ethics, unexpectedly high within public justifications of aggressive 
acts, and (4) particulate justifications emphasizing group-specific aspects are slightly 
dominant across groups. 
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Exploration of further Differences between the Groups 
In a third step, further differences in the argumentation patterns will be explored. Von 
Eye (1990) proposes a two-step procedure in order to explore different frequencies of 
configurations between independent groups. The first step consists of χ²-tests across all 
groups for each configuration. Should such a test reveal statistical significances, pair-
wise asymptotic hypergeometrical tests between the groups will indicate group-specific 
types of argumentation. As outlined earlier, the alpha-level needs adapting due to 
multiple testing (α* = .006).  
Table 8 shows the results of the χ²-tests across groups for each ethical 
configuration. It indicates that out of eight examined ethics, six are used to a different 
extent by the four groups. The groups do not seem to differ in respect to particulate 
utilitarianism (p = .016) and group-specific deontology (p = .162). Significant differences, 
though, seem to exist in the use of the remaining ethical positions, namely utilitarianism, 
deontology and the four ethics of negative expression. In order to reveal group-specific 
differences, pair-wise significance tests will be conducted based on asymptotic 
hypergeometrical testing. The results are displayed in table 9.  
The U.S. government and the Red Army Faction differ in two aspects 
significantly. The German terror organization engages more frequently in negative-
particulate utilitarianism than the North-American government (29.8 % vs. 10.6 %, p < 
.001), pointing at the negative consequences of the adversaries’ actions for a certain 
group of people (h = .483). Besides, 16.7 % of the explanations given by the Red Army 
Faction stress that the adversary’s action are not compatible with general responsibilities 
(D-), while the U.S. American government underlines this aspect only in 7 % of the 
statements (p = .003, h = .314). 
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Table 8: χ²-tests for each single ethical position across all groups (df = 3) 
 Observed frequencies (%)  Significance tests 
Ethics USA RAF Iraq Al-
Qaeda 
 
χ² (df = 3) p(χ²), 2-tailed 
PU 7,5 % 5,3 % 3,3 % 3,0 %  10,309 .016
PD 15,2 % 8,8 % 11,7 % 11,1 %  5,138 .162
U 13,1 % 4,4 % 3,8 % 1,3 %  53,173 * .000
D 19,7 % 12,3 % 11,7 % 23,7 %  16,498 * .001
PU- 10,6 % 29,8 % 29,1 % 18,4 %  43,692 * .000
PD- 12,0 % 8,8 % 30,5 % 20,2 %  41,513 * .000
U- 14,9 % 14,0 % 1,4 % 4,5 %  47,938 * .000
D- 7,0 % 16,7 % 8,5 % 17,9 %  28,471 * .000
 
Table 9: Pair-wise significance tests between the groups (* p < .006) 
Pair-wise Significance Tests (Fisher’s exact test, two-tailed) with Effect 
Sizes (h) 
Eth
. 
USA-
RAF h 
USA-
Iraq h 
USA-
al-Q. h 
RAF-
Iraq h 
RAF-
al-Q. h 
Iraq 
al-Q. h 
U .007  *.000 .335 *.000 .538 .773  .049  .073 
D .077  .011  .179  .860  .009  *.000 .317
PU- *.000  .483 *.000 .461 *.002 .20 .899  .013  *.003 .261
PD- .408  *.000 .474 *.001 .22 *.000 .572 *.005 .318 *.005 .254
U- .883  *.000 .595 *.000 .344 *.000 .567 *.001 .316 .060 
D- *.003 .314 .523  *.000 .34 .029 .889  *.002 .267
 
The Comparison of the justifications given by the U.S. and the former Iraqi government 
reveals four significant discrepancies.  The most striking difference lies within the use of 
indirect utilitarianism (h = .595). While the North-American government justifies the war 
against terror by stressing the terrifying impact of terrorist acts for mankind (14.9 %), the 
former Iraqi government engages in indirect utilitarianism in only 1.4 % of the statements 
(p < .001). A similar effect can be found on direct utilitarianism (13.1 % vs. 3.8 %, p 
<.001, h = .335). The Iraqi Government, instead, emphasizes more frequently on the 
enemy not fulfilling his responsibilities (PD-, 30.5 %) and on the resulting negative 
consequences for the Iraqi people (PU-, 29.1 %), while the U.S. government applies PD- 
in 12 % and PU- in 10.6 % of the explanations (p < .001). 
Five significant differences lie between the U.S. American justifications and the 
explanations given by al-Qaeda. Four differences are similar to the ones between the 
U.S. and the Iraqi government. In contrast to the U.S. government, members of al-
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Qaeda tend not to justify their acts with utilitarian arguments, be it in a direct (1.3 % vs. 
13.1 %, p < .001, h = .538) or indirect manner (4.5 % vs. 14.9 %, p < .001, h = .344). 
Instead, they rather focus on negative-particularistic aspects on the utilitarian dimension 
(18.4 % vs. 10.6 %, p = .002, h = .20) and on negative-particularistic deontology (20.2 % 
vs. 12.0 %, p = .001, h = .22). Additionally, the explanations given by al-Qaeda are likely 
to stress general negative deontological matters (17.9 %), taking the position that the 
enemy does not follow duties and values seen as universally valid. The U.S. 
government, on the contrary, engages in negative deontological justification in only 7 % 
of the statements (p < .001, h = .34).   
The justifications given by the Red Army Faction and the former Iraqi government 
differ in two aspects. As mentioned above, 30.5 % of the statements given by the Iraqi 
leaders focus on the enemy not fulfilling his duties, such as breaching particular 
agreements (PD-). The German terror organization, in contrast, engages in negative-
particular deontology only in 8.8 % of the explanations (p < .001, h = .572). Instead, it 
tries to justify acts of aggression by pointing at the negative impact of the adversary’s 
actions for the mankind (U-) in 14 % of the statements, while this perspective is only 
taken in 1.4 % of the justifications given by the former Iraqi government (p < .001, h = 
.567). 
Similar tendencies can be observed between the Red Army Faction and al-
Qaeda, although the effect size diminishes between the two terror organizations (8.8 % 
vs. 20.2 %, p < .001, h = .318 within negative-particulate deontology and 14.0 % vs. 4.5 
%, p < .001, h = .316 within negative utilitarianism). 
Four differences of rather small effect size can be observed between the former 
Iraqi government and explanations given by al-Qaeda. The biggest difference lies within 
deontology, which is used more frequently by al-Qaeda, be it in a direct (23.7 % vs. 11.7 
%, p < .001, h = .317) or in an indirect manner (17.9 % vs. 8.5 %, p = .267, h = .267). 
The former Iraqi government, instead, engages more often in negative-particulate 
utilitarianism (29.1 % vs. 18.4 %, p = .003, h = .261) and negative-particulate deontology 
(30.5 % vs. 20.2 %, p = .005, h = .237). 
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Interaction Patterns of Culture and Violence 
In a final step, the underlying interaction patterns of culture and violence will be 
determined for each ethical position. The magnitude of influence will be indicated by 
effect sizes for proportions (Cohen, 1977), with h = .20 referring to small effects and h = 
.50 implying medium effect sizes. With a sample size of N = 1166, effect sizes of h > 
.088 can be regarded as significant differences (*) between two proportions. Highly 
significant differences (**) are accounted for by h > .115. In the following section, only 
effect sizes reaching h ≥ .30 will be presented.  
Tables 10 – 13 display the distribution of each ethical position within the four 
groups. In addition, the prevalence within the two cultures and the two types of 
aggression is indicated in italics, while the total prevalence across all groups is printed in 
bold characters.  
Utilitarianism. Table 10 shows an interesting interaction pattern between culture 
and aggression. While utilitarian arguments have been prevalent within Western 
explanations (h = .392), it can also be stated that utilitarian patterns occur significantly 
more often within justifications of war than within justifications of terror (h = .360). Thus, 
acts of war seem to be justified more likely with achieving the utmost good for the 
majority. 
Table 10: Utilitarianism (U) 
 Western Countries Arabian Countries 
Total                           
(type of aggression) 
Terror  4,4 %  1,3 %   1,95 % (n = 10) 
War 13,1 %  3,8 % 10,07 % (n = 66) 
Total (culture) 11,33 % (n = 63)  2,13 % (n = 13)  6,52 % (N = 76) 
Cultural Effect Size: h = .392(**); Effect Size of Aggression: h = .360(**) 
 
 
Negative Utilitarianism. On the negative dimension, the use of utilitarian aspects 
seems to be rather influenced by cultural effects (table 11). The Western groups 
examined in this study employed negative utilitarian aspects significantly more often 
than the Arabian parties (h = .392). 
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Table 11: Negative Utilitarianism (U-) 
 Western Countries Arabian Countries 
Total                           
(type of aggression) 
Terror 14,0 %  4,5 %   6,65 %  (n =34) 
War 14,9 %  1,4 % 10,53 %  (n = 69) 
Total (culture) 14,75 %  (n = 82) 3,44 %  (n = 21) 8,8 % (N = 103) 
Cultural Effect Size: h = .392(**); Effect Size of Aggression: h = .140(**) 
 
Negative-particulate Deontology. The indirect expression of particulate 
deontology (table 12), shows to be clearly influenced by the cultural factor (h = .348 (**) 
vs. h = .026 (n.s.)). This result implies that Arabian groups emphasize on the opponent’s 
violation of specific duties more frequently than Western groups do.  
Table 12: Negative-particulate Deontology (PD-) 
 Western Countries Arabian Countries 
Total                           
(type of aggression) 
Terror  8,8 % 20,2 % 17,61 %  (n = 90) 
War 12,0 % 30,5 % 18,02 %  (n = 118) 
Total (culture) 11,33 % (n = 63) 23,77 %  (n = 145) 
17,84 % (N = 208) 
Cultural Effect Size: h = .348 (**); Effect Size of Aggression: h = .026 (n.s.) 
 
Negative Deontology. Within negative deontology, it can be observed that 
differences between the groups are rather influenced by the type of aggression (table 
13). While negative deontological aspects have been stressed in 17.61 % of the 
statements justifying terrorist attacks, only 7.48 % of the explanations given in order to 
justify war contained statements focusing on the enemy not fulfilling principles, norms 
and values seen as universally valid (h = .302). 
Table 13: Negative Deontology (D-) 
 Western Countries Arabian Countries 
Total                           
(type of aggression) 
Terror 16,7 % 17,9 % 17,61 %  (n = 90) 
War   7,0 %   8,5 %  7,48  %  (n = 49) 
Total (culture)  8,99 %  (n = 50) 14,59 %  (n = 89) 11,92 % (N = 139) 
Cultural Effect Size: h = .186(**); Effect Size of Aggression: h = .302(**) 
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Discussion 
The results indicate that certain ethical patterns of argumentation are predominant within 
the justification of war and terror. Based on the rather naïve assumption that the 
frequency of the twelve ethical justifications is equally distributed, we would expect a 
proportional rate of 8.33 % for each configuration. Statistical analysis reveals that only 
three types of ethical argumentation correspond to this assumption, namely direct 
utilitarianism, indirect utilitarianism, and negative deontology (figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Total frequency of ethical justification across groups. 
 
The individual level of judgement is clearly underrepresented. In addition, the particulate 
utilitarianism represents a rather seldom form of justification, revealing that the positive 
consequences for the own group resulting from the committed acts are not stressed in 
public. Negative-particulate utilitarianism, on the contrary, is a widely used type of 
argumentation, stating that a specific group will be affected by negative consequences if 
the enemy is not hindered from engaging in reprehensible acts. The use of negative-
particulate utilitarianism often goes along with justifications containing negative-
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particulate deontology, stressing that the enemy is not fulfilling his duties.  The own 
behavior, instead, is likely illustrated as being based on group-specific virtues (PD) and 
especially on universally valid rights and duties (D).  
The inference-statistical comparison between the groups shows that out of eight 
ethical justifications, six are used differently by the four groups. The U.S. government 
emphasizes utilitarian aspects (U) considerably more often than the other groups, 
stressing the positive consequences of their action for all of humanity. Justifications 
containing the negative expression of utilitarianism (U-), pointing at the potential threat of 
the adversary’s action for mankind, seem to be typical for both the U.S. government and 
the Red Army Faction. Group-specific utilitarianism (PU), in contrast, is rarely used by 
the four groups, whereas negative-particulate utilitarianism (PU-) is one of the major 
argumentation patterns observed within the statements of the Red Army Faction and the 
former Iraqi government. Up to a certain degree, this argumentation pattern can also be 
observed within statements given by al-Qaeda, while the U.S. government does not put 
emphasis on specific groups when outlining negative consequences of the adversary’s 
action.  
The most prevalent ethical argumentation pattern on the deontological dimension 
is represented by the direct deontology (D) which mainly occurs within statements by al-
Qaeda but not significantly less often within explanations of the U.S. government and the 
Red Army Faction. Thus, acts of aggression seem to be justified predominantly by 
referring to general principles, norms and values that are regarded as universally valid. 
The former Iraqi government, on the contrary, engages more frequently in negative-
particulate deontological argumentation, emphasizing the enemy’s violation of specific 
duties. This is not astonishing, since one of the major disputes between Iraq and Iran 
arouse out of violations of the 1975 Algiers Agreement.  
Taking a look at the similarities and differences between the groups, it can be 
stated that only a few, namely two differences become manifest between the U.S. and 
the Red Army Faction, the Red Army Faction and al-Qaeda, and the Red Army Faction 
and the former Iraqi government. Four differences have been observed between the 
U.S. and the Iraq, and Iraq and al-Qaeda. A clear difference appears between the U.S. 
and al-Qaeda, originating from five significant deviances. This is a striking result, since 
the U.S. government and al-Qaeda are direct opponents. While the U.S. demonstrates 
utilitarian thinking, stressing the utmost good for mankind in regard to her actions, al-
Qaeda very rarely engages in this sort of argumentation. Instead, the group outlines the 
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negative impact of the enemy’s action for the Muslim population. Furthermore, they 
regard the adversary’s actions to be not in accordance with group-specific duties, but 
violating norms and values seen as universally valid. While both regard it as their duty to 
undertake action against the other, the U.S. takes the standpoint of acting in favor of 
humanity and fulfilling the country’s role as a world power, whereas al-Qaeda justifies 
the committed acts with making a stand against immoral acts of the West and 
compensating for the suffering of the Muslim population. 
With respect to the influence of aggression on ethical argumentation, two major 
results were obtained. While war is justified by focusing on the best outcome for the 
majority, terror intends to fend off external values that are somehow detested and not 
seen as universally valid. In terms of cultural influences, it can be stated that Western 
countries tend to utilize general utilitarian argumentations stressing that an action must 
focus on the utmost good for the majority, while Arabian countries underline negative-
particulate aspects on the deontological dimension, pointing at the constant threat for 
their population that is due to the enemy’s violation of specific duties.  
The excessive use of indirect justifications displays the perceived need to 
proceed against specific outgroups. Only the U.S. diverges from this pattern, showing 
less concern for external influence, but rather pursuing its own values. This, again, could 
reflect their superior position of holding global power. 
The paper sought to introduce the extended prescriptive attribution model as a means to 
analyze prevalent ethical argumentations that are meant to justify politically motivated 
acts of aggression. The model constitutes a framework which makes it possible to 
ascribe the divergent justifications to central aspects, considering both the mode of 
moral reasoning and the level of judgement. Further, the differentiation between direct 
and indirect practices of justification represents a considerable refinement within the 
analysis of argumentation patterns. At the same time, the study indicates that the 
prescriptive attribution model can be simplified by omitting the individual level of 
judgement when dealing with the justification of social acts affecting a broad majority.  
However, the results need embedding in further research. The results obtained in 
this study indicate that the justification patterns vary according to cultural influences and 
the type of aggression. Nevertheless, further context variables should be considered in 
order to increase the understanding of interaction patterns between specific 
circumstances and the pursuit of values. Ethical principles that are extracted by 
analyzing public explanations illustrate primarily how political leaders try to convince a 
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vast majority that their actions are permissible. We cannot assume that public 
justifications exclusively reflect the personal beliefs of the actors. Thus, the context of 
communication needs to be considered more closely. It might be possible, for instance, 
that the emphasis on certain principles varies according to the addressee. In this regard, 
a speech in the UN General Assembly might differ from the one addressing soldiers in a 
military base. In particular, the role of motivation and the relationship between moral 
cognition and moral action merit examination (Blasi, 1980).  
The study revealed that there are significant differences between the groups with 
respect to the emphasis given to ethical principles. On the contrary, it illustrated that all 
general and particular justification patterns were employed across the groups. 
Furthermore, none of the twelve ethical argumentation patterns occurred solely within 
the justification of war or terror, and none occurred exclusively within Arabian and 
Western countries. The analysis of underlying ethical argumentations can foster an 
understanding of what lies behind strong positions that are perceived as radical on both 
sides. It should be recognized that despite putting different emphasis on certain criteria, 
all parties involve the very same principles in their thinking.  
 
References 
Bin Laden, O. (2001). Nineteen Students. December 26 2001. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) (2005). 
Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (pp. 145-157). London: 
Verso. 
Bin Laden, O. (2002). To the Americans. October 6 2002. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) (2005). 
Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (pp. 160-172). London: 
Verso. 
Bin Laden, O. (2002). To the Allies of America. November 12 2002. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) (2005). 
Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (pp. 173-175). London: 
Verso. 
Bin Laden, O. (2004). To the Peoples of Europe. April 15 2004. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) (2005). 
Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (pp. 233-236). London: 
Verso. 
Bin Laden, O. (2004). The Towers of Lebanon. October 29 2004. In: B. Lawrence (Ed.) (2005). 
Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama bin Laden (pp. 237-244). London: 
Verso. 
Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and moral action. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 1-45. 
Bush, G. W. (2001, September 20). Bush Announces Start of a "War on Terror". Retrieved 
9/25/2006, from http://amerikadienst.usembassy.de/us-botschaft-cgi/ad-
detailad.cgi?lfdnr=1340  
Bush, G. W. (2001, September 25). We're in a War We're Going to Win. Retrieved 9/25/2006, 
from http://amerikadienst.usembassy.de/us-botschaft-cgi/ad-detailad.cgi?lfdnr=1335  
Bush, G. W. (2002, March 15). Bush Outlines Second Phase of Global Terrorism War. Retrieved 
9/25/ 2006, from http://amerikadienst.usembassy.de/us-botschaft-cgi/ad-
detailad.cgi?lfdnr=1416  
26 
Bush, G. W. (2002, June 6). Bush Calls West Point Graduates to Service in Anti-Terror-Fight. 
Retrieved 9/25/2006, from http://amerikadienst.usembassy.de/us-botschaft-cgi/ad-
detailad.cgi?lfdnr=1469  
Bush, G. W. (2002, October 7). Bush Describes "Urgent Duty" to Confront Saddam Hussein. 
Retrieved 9/25/2006, from http://amerikadienst.usembassy.de/us-botschaft-cgi/ad-
detailad.cgi?lfdnr=1504  
Calhoun, L. (2001). The metaetical paradox of Just War Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 4, 41-58. 
Christopher, P. (1999). The Ethics of War and Peace (2d ed.). Upper Saddle River, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Coady, C. A. J. (2001). Terrorism. In L. C. Becker, & C. B. Becker (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Ethics 
(2nd ed.) (pp. 1696-1699). New York: Routledge. 
Coady, C. A. J. (2004). Terrorism, Morality, and Supreme Emergency. Ethics, 114, 772-789. 
Cohen, J. (1977). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. New York, NY: Acad. 
Press. 
Forsyth, D. R. (1980). A taxonomy of ethical ideologies. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 39, 175-184. 
Forsyth, D. R., & Pope, W. R. (1984). Ethical ideology and judgments of social psychological 
research: A multidimensional analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 
1365-1375. 
Forsyth, D. R., & Nye, J. L. (1990). Personal moral philosophies and moral choice. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 24, 398-414. 
Gollenia, M. C. (1999). Ethische Entscheidungen und Rechtfertigungen unter der besonderen 
Bedingung der sozialen Identität. Frankfurt a. M: Lang. 
Hackel, S. (1995). Berufliche Sozialisation und Identität Ost- und Westdeutscher Arbeitsnehmer. 
Wetzlar: Kletsmeier. 
Harman, G., & Thomson, J. J. (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley. 
Hoffmann, M. (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee Fraktion. Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF. 
Berlin: ID-Verlag. 
Hunt, S. D., & Vitell, S. (1986). A general theory of marketing ethics. Journal of Macromarketing, 
6 (Spring), 5-16. 
Hussein, S. (1981). Rede des Staatspräsidenten der Republik Irak Saddam Hussein auf der 
Islamischen Gipfelkonferenz (Ende Januar 1981 in Ta’if – Saudi Arabien). Bonn: 
Presseabteilung in der Botschaft der Republik Irak 
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V.A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 3, 1-24. 
Kant, I. (1797). Metaphysik der Sitten. Königsberg. 
Keller, M. (1984). Rechtfertigungen. In W. Edelstein, & J. Habermas (Eds.), Soziale Interaktionen 
und soziales Verstehen (pp. 253-299). Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 
Keller, M., & Edelstein, W. (1991). The development of socio-moral meaning making: domains, 
categories, and perspective-taking. In W. M. Kurtines, & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook 
of moral behavior and development (Vol. 2) (pp. 89-114). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Kelley, H. H. (1973). The process of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 28, 107-128. 
Kienpointner, M. (1992). Alltagslogik. Struktur und Funktion von Argumentationsmustern. 
Stuttgart - Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog. 
Klein, J. (1987). Die konklusiven Sprechhandlungen. Studien zur Pragmatik, Semantik, Syntax 
und Lexik von Begründen, Erklären-warum, Folgern und Rechtfertigen. Tübingen: 
Niemeyer. 
Lawrence, B. (Ed.) (2005). Messages to the World. The statements of Osama Bin Laden. London: 
Verso. 
Maeng, Y.-J. (1996). Ethische Positionen als Handlungsrechtfertigung interpersonaler 
Handlungen: Ein Kulturvergleich zwischen Korea (ROK) und Deutschland. Münster: 
Waxmann. 
27 
McMahan, J. (2004). The Ethics of Killing in War. Ethics, 114, 693-733. 
Messick, D. M., & Mackie, D. M. (1989). Intergroup relations. Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 
51-81. 
Perdue, C. W., Dovidio. J. F., Gurtman, M. B., & Tyler, R. B. (1990). Us and them: Social 
categorization and the process of intergroup bias. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 59, 475-486. 
Regan, R. J. (1996). Just War: Principles and Cases. Washington D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America. 
Rehbein, J. (1972). Entschuldigungen und Rechtfertigungen. Zur Sequenzierung von 
kommunikativen Handlungen. In D. Wunderlich (Ed.), Linguistische Pragmatik (pp. 288-
317). Frankfurt a. M.: Athenäum. 
Rote Armee Fraktion (1972). Anschlag auf das Hauptquartier der US-Army in Frankfurt/M. 
Erklärung vom 14.5.1972. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee Fraktion. Texte und 
Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 145). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1972). Anschläge in Augsburg und München. Erklärung vom 16.5.1972. In: 
M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee Fraktion. Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte 
der RAF (p. 145). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1972). Anschlag auf den BGH-Richter Buddenberg in Karlsruhe. Erklärung 
vom 20.5.1972. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee Fraktion. Texte und 
Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 146). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1972). Sprengstoffanschlag auf das Springer-Hochhaus in Hamburg. 
Erklärung vom 20.5.1972. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee Fraktion. Texte und 
Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 147). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1972). Bombenanschlag auf das Hauptquartier der US-Armee in Europa in 
Heidelberg. Erklärung vom 25.5.1972. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee 
Fraktion. Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 148). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1977). Erschießung von Jürgen Ponto und Anschlag auf die 
Bundesanwaltschaft in Karlsruhe. Erklärung vom 14.8.1977. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). 
Rote Armee Fraktion. Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 269). Berlin: ID-
Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1979). Sprengstoffanschlag auf den Oberbefehlshaber der NATO – 
General Alexander Haig. Erklärung vom 26.6.1979. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote 
Armee Fraktion. Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 269). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1981). Bombenanschlag auf das Hauptquartier der US Air Force in 
Ramstein. Erklärung vom 31.8.1981. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee Fraktion. 
Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 288). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1981). Anschlag auf den Oberkommandierenden der US-Armee General 
Kroesen in Heidelberg. Erklärung vom 15.9.1981. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote 
Armee Fraktion. Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 289). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Rote Armee Fraktion (1984). Sprengstoffanschlag auf die NATO Shape-School in 
Oberammergau. Erklärung vom 20.12.1984. In: M. Hoffmann (Ed.) (1997). Rote Armee 
Fraktion. Texte und Materialien zur Geschichte der RAF (p. 327). Berlin: ID-Verlag.  
Sidgwick, H. (1874). The methods of ethics. London. 
Smilansky, S. (2004). Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion. Ethics, 114, 790-805. 
Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1982). Social identity and intergroup relations. London: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Turner, J. C. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, 
England: Basil Blackwell. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 ed.). War. Retrieved 9/19/2006, from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war  
Von Eye, A. (1990). Introduction to configural frequency analysis: the search for types and 
antitypes in cross-classifications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Walzer, M. (1977). Just and Unjust Wars. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Webster's Dictionary (2006). War. Retrieved 9/19/2006, from http://www.m-w.com/ dictionary/War  
Weiner, B. (1985). "Spontaneous" causal thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 97, 74-84. 
28 
Wirtz, M., & Caspar, F. (2002). Beurteilerübereinstimmung und Beurteilerreliabilität: Methoden zur 
Bestimmung und Verbesserung der Zuverlässigkeit von Einschätzungen mittels 
Kategoriensystemen und Ratingskalen. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Witte, E. H., & Doll, J. (1995). Soziale Kognition und empirische Ethikforschung zur 
Rechtfertigung von Handlungen. In E. H. Witte (Ed.), Soziale Kognition und empirische 
Ethikforschung (pp. 97-115). Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers. 
Witte, E. H. (2002). Classical ethical positions and their relevance in justifying behavior: A model 
of prescriptive attribution. (Hamburger Forschungsbericht zur Sozialpsychologie Nr. 42). 
Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, Arbeitsbereich Sozialpsychologie.  
Witte, E. H., & Heitkamp, I. (2005). Empirical research on ethics: The influence of social roles on 
decisions and on their ethical justification. (Hamburger Forschungsbericht zur 
Sozialpsychologie Nr. 61). Hamburg: Universität Hamburg, Arbeitsbereich 
Sozialpsychologie. 
 
  
 
- HAFOS - 
 
Die Hamburger Forschungsberichte zur Sozialpsychologie werden herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. Erich H. Witte 
und können als gedruckte Version über die folgende Adresse bezogen werden: 
 
Prof. Dr. Erich H. Witte 
Universität Hamburg 
Arbeitsbereich Sozialpychologie 
Von-Melle-Park 5 
20146 Hamburg 
E-Mail: witte_e_h@uni-hamburg.de 
 
Die Mehrzahl der Forschungsberichte steht als PDF ( ) – Datei zum Download zur Verfügung unter: 
http://www.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereiche-einrichtungen/fb16/absozpsy/hafos.html 
 
 
HAFOS Nr. 1 
1992 
Witte, E.H.: The extended group situation theory (EGST), social decision schemes, 
models of the structure of communication in small groups, and specific effects 
of minority influences and selfcategorization: An integration.  
HAFOS Nr. 2 
1992 
Witte, E.H., & Scherm, M.: Technikfolgenabschätzung und Gentechnologie – Die 
exemplarische Prüfung eines Experten-berichts auf psychologische Konsistenz 
und Nachvollziehbarkeit. 
HAFOS Nr. 3 
1992 
Witte, E.H.: Dynamic models of social influence in small group research. 
HAFOS Nr. 4 
1993 
Witte, E.H., & Sonn, E.: Trennungs- und Scheidungsberatung aus der Sicht der 
Betroffenen: Eine empirische Erhebung. 
HAFOSNr. 5 
1993 
 
Witte, E.H., Dudek, I., & Hesse, T.: Personale und soziale Identität von ost- und 
westdeutschen Arbeitnehmern und ihre Auswirkung auf die 
Intergruppenbeziehungen. 
HAFOS Nr. 6 
1993 
Hackel, S., Zülske, G., Witte, E.H., & Raum, H.: Ein Vergleichberufsrelevanter 
Eigenschaften von „ost- und westdeutschen“ Arbeitnehmern am Beispiel der 
Mechaniker. 
HAFOS Nr. 7 
1994 
Witte, E.H.: The Social Representation as a consensual system and correlation 
analysis. 
HAFOS Nr. 8 
1994 
Doll, J., Mentz, M., & Witte, E.H.: Einstellungen zur Liebe und Partnerschaft: vier 
Bindungsstile. 
HAFOS Nr. 9 
1994 
Witte, E.H.: A statistical inference strategy (FOSTIS): A non- confounded hybrid theory. 
HAFOS Nr. 10 
1995 
 Witte, E.H., & Doll, J.: Soziale Kognition und empirische Ethikforschung: Zur 
Rechtfertigung von Handlungen. 
HAFOS Nr. 11 
1995 
Witte, E.H.: Zum Stand der Kleingruppenforschung.  
 
HAFOS Nr. 12 
1995 
Witte, E.H., & Wilhelm, M.: Vorstellungen über Erwartungen an eine Vorlesung zur 
Sozialpsychologie. 
HAFOS Nr. 13 
1995 
 
Witte, E.H.: Die Zulassung zum Studium der Psychologie im WS 1994/95 in Hamburg: 
Ergebnisse über die soziodemographische Verteilung der Erstsemester und die 
Diskussion denkbarer Konsequenzen. 
HAFOS Nr. 14 
1995 
Witte, E.H., & Sperling, H.: Wie Liebesbeziehungen den Umgang mit Freunden geregelt 
wünschen: Ein Vergleich zwischen den Geschlechtern. 
HAFOS Nr. 15 
1995 
Witte, E.H.: Soziodemographische Merkmale der DoktorandInnen in Psychologie am 
Hamburger Fachbereich. 
HAFOS Nr. 16 
1996 
Witte, E.H.: Wertewandel in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West) zwischen 1973 bis 
1992: Alternative Interpretationen zum Ingelhart-Index. 
HAFOS Nr. 17 
1996 
Witte, E.H., & Lecher, Silke: Systematik von Beurteilungskriterien für die Güte von 
Gruppenleistungen. 
HAFOS Nr. 18 
1997 
Witte, E.H., & Kaufman, J.: The Stepwise Hybrid Statistical InferenceStrategy: FOSTIS. 
HAFOS Nr. 19 
1997 
 
Kliche, T., Adam, S., & Jannink, H.: „Bedroht uns der Islam?“ Die Konstruktion eines 
„postmodernen“ Feindbildes am Beispiel Algerien in zwei exemplarischen 
Diskursanalysen. 
HAFOS Nr. 20 
1998 
Witte, E.H., & Pablocki, Frank von: Unterschiede im Handlungsstil: Lage- und 
Handlungsorientierung in Problemlöse-Dyaden. 
 
HAFOS Nr. 21 
1998 
Witte, E.H., Sack, P.-M., & Kaufman, J.: Synthetic Interaction and focused Activity in 
Sustainment of the Rational Task-Group. 
HAFOS Nr. 22 
1999 
Bleich, C., Witte, E.H., & Durlanik, T.: Soziale Identität und Partnerwahl: 
Partnerpräferenzen von Deutschen und Türken der zweiten Generation 
HAFOS Nr. 23 
1999 
Porschke, C.: Zur Entwicklung unternehmensspezifischer Anforderungsprofile mit der 
Repertory Grid Technik: Ergebnisse einer empirischen Studie. 
HAFOS Nr. 24 
2000 
Witte, E.H., & Putz, Claudia: Routinebesprechungen: Deskription, Intention, Evaluation 
und Differenzierung.  
HAFOS Nr. 25 
2000 
Witte, E.H.: Kundenorientierung: Eine Managementaufgabe mit psychologischem 
Feingefühl 
HAFOS Nr. 26 
2000 
Witte, E.H.: Die Entwicklung einer Gruppenmoderationstheorie für Projektgruppen und 
ihre empirische Überprüfung. 
HAFOS Nr. 27 
2000 
Figen Karadayi: Exposure to a different culture and related autonomousself: A 
comparison of remigrant and nonmigrant turkish lateadolescent groups. 
HAFOS Nr. 28 
2000 
Witte, E.H., & Raphael, Christiane: Alter, Geschlecht und Informationsstand als 
Determinanten der Einstellung zum Euro 
HAFOS Nr. 29 
2001 
Witte, Erich H.: Bindung und romantische Liebe: SozialpsychologischeAspekte der 
Bindungstheorie. 
HAFOS Nr. 30 
2001 
Witte, Erich H.: Theorien zur sozialen Macht. 
HAFOS Nr. 31 
2001 
Witte, Erich H.: Wertewandel, wirtschaftliche Prozesse und Wählerverhalten: 
Sozialpsychologische Gesetzmäßigkeiten zur Erklärung und Bekämpfung von 
Ausländerfeindlichkeit. 
HAFOS Nr. 32 
2001 
Lecher, Silke, & Witte, E. H.: FORMOD und PROMOD: State of the Art der Moderation 
des Gruppenproblemlösens. 
HAFOS Nr. 33 
2001 
Porschke, Christine, & Witte, E. H.: Psychologische Faktoren der Steuergerechtigkeit. 
HAFOS Nr. 34 
2001 
Tettenborn, Annette: Zeitgemäßes Lernen an der Universität: „Neuer Wein in alte 
Schläuche?“ 
HAFOS Nr. 35 
2001 
Witte, Erich H.: Wirtschaftspsychologische Ursachen politischerProzesse: Empirische 
Belege und ein theoretisches Konzept. 
HAFOS Nr. 36 
2001 
Witte, Erich H.: Der Köhler-Effekt: Begriffsbildung, seine empirische Überprüfung und 
ein theoretisches Konzept.  
HAFOS Nr. 37 
2001 
Diverse: Zwischen Couch, Coaching und ‚neuen kleinen Feldern‘ – Perspektiven 
Angewandter Psychologie. Beiträge zum 75jährigen Jubiläum der Gesellschaft 
zur Förderung der Angewandten Psychologie e.V. 
HAFOS Nr. 38 
2001 
Witte, Erich H.: Ethische Grundpositionen und ihre Bedeutung bei der Rechtfertigung 
beruflicher Handlungen.  
HAFOS Nr. 39 
2002 
Witte, Erich H.: The group polarization effect: To be or not to be? 
HAFOS Nr. 40 
2002 
Witte, Erich H.: The Köhler Effect: Definition of terms, empirical observations and 
theoretical concept. 
HAFOS Nr. 41 
2002 
Witte, Erich H.: Das Hamburger Hochschulmodernisierungsgesetz: Eine 
wissenschaftlich-psychologische Betrachtung. 
HAFOS Nr. 42 
2003 
Witte, Erich H.: Classical ethical positions and their relevance in justifying behavior: A 
model of pescriptive attribution. 
HAFOS Nr. 43 
2003 
Witte, Erich H.: Wie verändern Globalisierungsprozesse den Menschen in seinen 
Beziehungen? Eine sozialpsychologische Perspektive. 
HAFOS Nr. 44 
2003 
Witte, Erich H., & Putz, Claudia: Paarbeziehungen als Mikrosysteme: Ableitung und 
empirische Prüfung von theoretischen Annahmen. 
HAFOS Nr. 45 
2003 
Trepte, S., Ranné, N., & Becker, M.: Patterns of New Media Adoption in a World of 
Hybrid Media. 
HAFOS Nr. 46 
2003 
Trepte, S.: Daily as Self-Realization – An Empirical Study on Audience Participation in 
Daily Talk Shows. 
HAFOS Nr. 47 
2003 
Witte, Erich H., & Engelhardt, Gabriele: Gruppen-entscheidungen bei „Hidden Profiles“ 
‚Shared View‘ – Effekt oder kollektiver ‚Primacy‘-Effekt? Empirische 
Ergebnisse und theoretische Anmerkungen. 
HAFOS Nr: 48 
2003 
Witte, Erich H., & Raphael, Christiane: Der EURO, der junge Konsument und die 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. 
HAFOS Nr. 49 
2003 
Witte, Erich H., & Scheffer, Julia: Die Steuerreform und der Konsumanreiz: Eine 
wirtschaftlichspsychologische Betrachtung. 
HAFOS Nr. 50 
2004 
Witte, Erich H.: Theorienentwicklung und –konstruktion in der Sozialpsychologie. 
HAFOS Nr. 51 
2004 
Witte, Erich H., & Janetzki, Evelyn: Fragebogenentwicklung zur Lebensgestaltung. 
HAFOS Nr. 52 
2004 
Witte, Erich H., & Engelhardt, Gabriele: Towards a theoretically based Group 
Facilitation Technique for Project Teams 
HAFOS Nr. 53 
2004 
Scheffer, Julia, & Witte, Erich H.: Der Einfluss von makrosozialer wirtschaftlicher 
Bedrohung auf die Leistungsfähigkeit. 
HAFOS Nr. 54 
2004 
Witte, Erich H., & Wolfram, Maren: Erwartungen und Vorstellungen über die Vorlesung 
Psychologie. 
HAFOS Nr. 55 
2005 
Heitkamp, Imke, Borchardt, Heike, & Witte, Erich H.: Zur simulierten Rechtfertigung 
wirtschaftlicher und medizinischer Entscheidungen in Ethikkomissionen: Eine 
empirische Analyse des Einflusses verschiedener Rollen. 
HAFOS Nr. 56 
2005 
Witte, Erich H.: Sozialisationstheorien. 
HAFOS Nr. 57 
2005 
van Quaquebeke, Niels, & Plum, Nina: Outside-In: Eine Perspektivbestimmung zum 
Umgang mit Wissen in der Sozialpsychologie. 
HAFOS Nr. 58 
2005 
Witte, Erich H., & Heitkamp, Imke: Quantitative Rekonstruktionen (Retrognosen) als 
Instrument der Theorienbildung in der Sozialpsychologie. 
HAFOS Nr. 59 
2005 
Witte, Erich H., van Quaquebeke, Niels, & Mölders, Christina: 
Mehrwertsteuererhöhung: Eine wirtschaftspsychologische Analyse ihrer 
Wirkung. 
HAFOS Nr. 60 
2005 
Trepte, Sabine, & Scherer, Helmut: What do they really know? Differentiating Opinion 
Leaders into ‘Dazzlers’ and ‘Experts’.  
HAFOS Nr. 61 
2005 
Witte, Erich H., & Heitkamp, Imke: Empirical research on ethics: The influence of social 
roles on decisions and on their ethical justification. 
HAFOS Nr. 62 
2005 
Witte, Erich H., & Heitkamp, Imke, & Wolfram, Maren: Zur simulierten Rechtfertigung 
wirtschaftlicher und medizinischer Entscheidungen in Ethikkommissionen: Eine 
empirische Analyse des Einflusses von Rollenerwartungen. 
HAFOS Nr. 63 
2005 
Witte, Erich H.: Macht. 
HAFOS Nr. 64 
2005 
Witte, Erich H.: Soziale Beziehungen, Gruppen- und Intergruppenprozesse. 
HAFOS Nr. 65 
2006 
Witte, Erich H.: Gruppenleistungen. Eine Gegenüberstellung von ultimater und 
proximater Beurteilung. 
HAFOS Nr. 66 
2006 
Witte, Erich H.: Interpersonale Kommunikation, Beziehungen und Gruppen-
Kollaboration. 
HAFOS Nr. 67 
2006 
Witte, Erich H.: Group performance: A confrontation of a proximate with an ultimate 
evaluation. 
HAFOS Nr. 68 
2006 
Witte, Erich H.: Das Studierverhalten von DiplompsychologInnen in Hamburg und 
mögliche Hinweise für die Konzeption eines Bachelor/Master-Studiums. 
HAFOS Nr. 69 
2006 
Witte, Erich H. & Mölders, Christina: Einkommensteuergesetz: Begründung der 
vorhandenen Ausnahmetatbestände ethisch bedenklich. 
 
 
 
 
